Despite these warnings, the OQMG was extremely confident in their preparations, coupled with the assurances from prime contractors that sustainable production of 1,000 liners per week was achievable by May 1, 1942. With what time would reveal as having been “overly optimistic,” the OQMG decided to forego all efforts to standardize, experiment with, or centralize any aspect of the process, choosing instead to push for immediate production. In this push for speed, each individual prime contractor would assume responsibility for all aspects of liner manufacturing.
Unlike the OQMG, the CQMD had a slightly more sober perspective. Like the OQMG, the CQMD was optimistic; however, they also seemed to understand that success would not necessarily happen quickly or without issues. They knew that engineering a viable plastic liner suitable for immediate large-scale production would require coordination of high-level technical communication between the OQMG and civilian manufacturing. More importantly, they would have to successfully develop new methods and techniques capable of shaping new materials, the properties of which the very industry they would have to assist did not fully understand, into a liner based on specifications that were, at best, tentative, vague, and in a state of constant change.
As it turned out, coordinating communication between the parties involved would be of little importance compared to the long list of other obstacles the CQMD would face during the first three months of their new assignment. Despite their early show of confidence, the industry found itself unprepared for the actual demands of this new product, while the QMC struggled with a lack of defined leadership.
In late April, awareness of difficulties hindering production prompted the CQMD to send officers on field trips to ascertain what the difficulties were and how quickly liner production could be expedited. On April 21, 1942, the CQMD informed the OQMG that Inland and MSA were not yet in production, and although the remaining prime contractors were, cumulatively, they only had around 50,000 liners on hand.
The reasons behind the initial failure of the plastic liner program to attain early production are varied, interweaving, technical, and complex. The CQMD referred to these various obstacles as "bottlenecks" to production and, upon discovery, addressed them immediately until they found reasonable solutions.
Identifying the six basic requirements for the manufacture of the plastic liner is crucial to better understanding the obstacles the CQMD discovered during their April inspections. These requirements include steel molds, plastic-impregnated duck cloth, hydraulic presses, paint, suspensions with hardware, and finally, assembly.
Each of these six requirements presented a unique set of challenges to overcome, which is a story within itself; the primary difficulty for all was the time delay it took to secure additional equipment and access critical materials. Ultimately, contradictory directives arising from confusion over which branch within the QMC had authority over decision-making for this new product, combined with prime contractors experiencing problems they did not foresee due to their inexperience, pushed the predicted timeline for sustained production back into the late fall of 1942.
Now you know….
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